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Self-Deceptive Idea Formations and U.S. Foreign Policy
"The danger lies not only in the adverse international
trends that are unfolding, but also in the risk that the US government may not
understand them."
from a 1999 Pentagon Report to senior officials
quoted in R. Goldstein, (ATimes:2/24/04)
by
Guntram Werther Ph.D.
Gold Canyon, Arizona
April 3, 2004
Introduction:
This is the second part of a non-partisan lecture on the subject of "Why we
so often get it wrong internationally" that was begun as a guest of the
Gold Canyon Democratic Club. In that lecture I used a synonym for the term
"self-deceptive" that was deemed perhaps too offensive to our current
genteel audience. Never-the-less much of our typical analysis of international
events turns out to be very wrong, and often tragically so.
Critiques - internal and otherwise - of the US intelligence and foreign affairs
establishment are so common, devastating, and of such long duration that one
would expect significant changes. Change rarely comes perhaps because of the
mutually reinforcing nature of the policy "game" itself.
Self-Deception as Policy?:
In the first lecture, I pointed out the highly interconnected and bureaucratic
nature of the international affairs community, and the similarly
idea-reinforcing way in which we educate, fund, hire, and thus subsequently
eventually "see" international issues and solutions. Together these
arrangements just about guarantee less than effective actions. We literally get
what we pay for BECAUSE we mostly pay for what we want to get.
Consider the US Defense Department's Strategic Studies Institute's recent
description of our current war efforts as "politically, fiscally, and
militarily unsustainable" (Goldstein, R., 'Al Queda has got it wrong',
ATimes.com, 2-24-2004). This is, one must admit, an interesting conclusion.
According to Goldstein, not only does Al Queda have a fundamentally wrong view
of the way the world operates; so do we. Al Queda cannot win, nor can we: a
clash of self-deceptions is underway according to this assessment.
Why do we do this?:
Previously, I brought to the discussion US Senator (D) Daniel Patrick Moynihan's
as yet unanswered question: If free markets are best for wealth creation, why is
secrecy and bureaucracy best for idea formation?
In his book "Secrecy" (1998), Moynihan notices that secrecy is mostly
useful for concealing errors and misjudgements, and concludes that the culture
of secrecy seriously inhibits our ability to judge events and trends accurately.
More, secrecy permits misjudgements to persist; the thesis being that error is
not as sustainable with many persons judging.
In the short-term, secrecy and secretiveness may give one a great advantage in
pursuing what one wishes were true, but since one's actions are more likely out
of tune with reality, longer term outcomes are unlikely to be very good.
Foreign policy made and supported in this way likely has similar effectiveness
and beneficence trajectories. Quoting Karl Popper who quotes Pericles of Athens;
"Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge
it" (Popper, K. 1962. "The Open Society and Its Enemies").
This makes more rather than less sense when one also considers that Markus Wolf,
the "Man Without a Face" and longtime head of East German HVA
intelligence during the Cold War, preferred the reports of journalists to those
of agents for precisely this reason. Consider that Winston Churchill frequently
had a better understanding of evolving world events than the British state by
using the expedient of talking to knowledgeable people and then thinking the
matter through himself (Manchester, W. 1988. "Winston Spencer Churchill -
Alone"). It was Sir Winston Churchill almost alone among Western statesmen
saw the rise of German and Italian fascism for what it was.
Finally consider that "the great mass of information can be obtained from
open sources", and the greatest asset is the "3x5 index card"
(Winks, R. 1987. "Cloak and Gown", p 62-63). Actually, it is an open,
independent, and unconstrained - such as by bureaucrats and "the
rules" - mind.
What is said above about secrecy and secretiveness seems likewise true of
bureaucracy and the organizational "men" doing analysis. Rare indeed
must be the person who, when confronted with a problem requiring a truly
innovative solution, first bethinks himself "I think I'll call the
government!"
Scholarship, analysis, and government policy-making are nothing today within the
USA if they are not highly interpenetrated bureaucracies. I heard recently a
person say of a college that is being set up locally, that the school would not
have tenure because they didn't want any liberals sneaking in; Heavens preserve
us from having students encountering an idea they do not agree with! It is
entirely obvious that at many other schools being a conservative (or anything
else not locally popular) is a road to career ruin.
Since innovative ideas are virtually by definition not popular, this
bureaucratically organizational and "team player" kind of mind set
almost entirely explains the narrowness of American thought and policy about
world affairs, in my opinion. It is the root of self-deceptions and of that
which flows from them. A good idea survives in the sunshine and open air.
Markets, intelligence, foreign policy, and effectiveness:
It is obvious that aspects of foreign policy and intelligence MUST be secret and
that some bureaucracy is necessary, but that may be far less than is commonly
supposed. This is a matter of effectiveness in analysis.
If the ideas are good and openly debated, then policy self-deceptions do not
prosper, and thus the foreign policy of this country will likely be improved.
Markets in ideas do that. This is not a partisan question, but one for mature
discussion. Thank you.
NOTE: NOT INCLUDED HERE ARE SEVERAL CASES PRESENTED IN THE LECTURE OF
SELF-DECEPTIVE IDEA FORMATIONS, AND THEIR SPECIFIC ADVERSE CONSEQUNCES IN
FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES.
Copyright Guntram Werther Ph.D. April 2004.
This essay may be reproduced for non-commercial purposes so long as attribution
of authorship is given.
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